

2008 Isaac Roet Prize essay submission

A Meta-Intervention for the Israel-Palestine Conflict
Incorporating Economic and Social Justice Issues.

Introduction: A Meta-Intervention for a Meta-Conflict.

The potential for equal access to economic resources to prevent or alleviate inter-communal violent conflict and build sustainable peace is elucidated by Johan Galtung (1990):

peace theory is intimately connected not only with conflict theory, but equally with development theory. And peace research, defined of as ‘research into the *conditions*-past, present, and future-of realizing peace’, will be equally intimately connected with conflict research and development research; the former often more relevant to for negative peace and the latter for positive peace, but with highly important overlaps (p.13; emphasis added).

Likewise Jean Paul Lederach warns explicitly that:

we must be careful not to push a single theoretical approach as the only mechanism for understanding social conflict...an integrative, comprehensive analytical framework is not merely instructive but imperative to meet the needs of peace building today (Lederach, 1995, p.9 & 1997, p.61).

This is one such attempt at presenting an integrated meta-intervention for sustained peace which incorporates just access to economic resources within a broader framework. Firstly I will introduce some helpful theoretical concepts to outline the overriding framework. Secondly, I will introduce the Israeli-Palestine conflict, which throughout will serve as an illustrative example of the kind of conflict where this meta-intervention could be applied. Reference to a detailed case-study will enable the clear illustration of how a combination of strategies can interact to promote global stability through stronger social, cultural, and economic relationships. Thirdly, the first arm of the meta-intervention will be introduced: an Interactive Problem Solving strategy. Section Four will outline the concepts of “peace building gaps” which detail some of the social and

economic policy challenges for implementing IPS interventions. In Section Five, a programme of positive reinforcement focusing on increased access to economic resources will be introduced in response to the behavioural/motivational side of these policy challenges. In section six, I will outline a media campaign in reaction to the social/cognitive challenges of IPS implementation and positive economic reinforcement. Lastly, I will attempt to show how these three interventions can work together, supporting the effectiveness of each strategy while compensating for each-others weaknesses and culminating in increased inter-national stability through sustainable peace and an increased sense of economic justice for all parties.

I. A Brief Introduction to the Palestine-Israel Conflict

The Israel-Palestine Conflict involves several long term issues and conflict drivers. These include, the status of Jerusalem; whether it would be included as the capital of an Israeli state, Palestinian state, both or neither. Also, the right of Palestinian refugees, displaced since 1948, to return to their and their families' homes in the Israel. Thirdly, what should happen to Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territory of the West Bank. Fourth, the recognition of the state of Israel, which is still not acknowledged by Hamas, (now head of the Palestinian Authority) and near-by states such as Syria and Saudi Arabia. Fifth, the unequal accessibility of natural resources between the two parties. And finally the collective violence which both sides have suffered during the conflict which has exacerbated the above issues (Harel, Lssacharoff & Azoulay 2008; Sockol, 2008b; Vogel, 2007; Wilson, 2007b).

A number of shorter term issues are also involved. Despite Hamas' 2006 victory in Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections, the international community has refused to acknowledge them as the new head of the Palestinian government. The West Bank and Gaza have experienced serious economic decline since the Second Intifada in September 2000, due largely to Israeli border closures which have been exacerbated by the international communities' financial embargo since Hamas took power. Hamas' ability to store and deploy Qassam rockets has also increased with a

corresponding increase in Israeli Defence Force (IDF) operations in Gaza (Harel, 2008; Wilson, 2007b). Hamas agreed to a six month truce with Israel in mid June 2008. This expired in mid December 2008 as has not been renewed as of late December.

In 2002 the Israeli government started construction on a 730 kilometre barrier to separate Israeli citizens from almost all the West Bank's Palestinian population. The Israel Diplomatic Network (n.d.) reports that this has significantly reduced suicide attacks in Israel. However the path of the fence confiscates a large amount of land that falls on the Palestinian side of the Green Line established by the armistice of the 1948-1949 Arab-Israeli war (*Israel/Palestine Politics*, 2007; Etkes, 2007).

Socially, Israel's Arab citizens also face institutional exclusion from various areas of life including housing, wealthier schools (Arab schools consistently receive less funding), and military service, which creates opportunities in politics and gives an important shared experience in Israeli life (Wilson, 2007a).

As for the parties to the conflict, the Palestinian side is presently internally fractured. Following the Hamas' take over of the PLC, President Abbas of the Fatah faction has been unable to negotiate a unified political program acceptable to the international community which could lift economic sanctions (*CIA Factfile: West Bank*, 2007). And communication is at present very limited between the two Palestinian factions (*Hamas: Abbas*, 2008).

The Israeli side is also splintered. Hawkish and religiously conservative Israelis are represented by the nationalist Yisrael Beiteinu Party and the religious Shas Party in the Israeli government. They argue that the maintenance of Jewish West Bank settlements, the non return of Palestinian refugees, and the status Jerusalem are non-negotiable (Kershner, 2008a; Kershner, 2008b). With the resumption of peace talks 15th of January 2008, Yisrael Beiteinu withdrew from the governing coalition. The Shas Party has also threatened to do so should these topics be included in negotiations (Kershner, 2008a; Kershner, 2008b). Indeed Reuveny (2003) notes that Israeli governments' unwillingness to withdraw from Jewish settlements in the Palestinian

territories during Oslo was motivated principally by a fear that such an evacuation would lead to civil war in Israel (p.361).

Moderate Israelis are represented in government by Prime Minister Ehud's Olmert Likud party and major coalition partner the Labor party. Mr Olmert's office has stated that they are "determined to continue the diplomatic negotiations out of recognition that they contain the only real chance to assure the peace and security of Israel's citizens" (Kershner, 2008a, *section and pages unmarked*). Sockol (2007) notes that by enduring the withdrawal of Yisrael Beiteinu from government, Mr Olmert is communicating to the Labor Party that he is committed to peace talks with the Palestinians: he could then also attract the support of the dovish Meretz party, another religious party, or Israeli peace movements such as "Peace Now" (in Hebrew: *Shalom Akhshav*).

This split in Israeli opinion has been replicated among younger Israelis as well. A survey of 5000 Jewish Israeli and 1200 Arab Israeli high school students carried out in 2000 showed that "47 percent of the Jewish students said they hated *haredim* (ultra-orthodox Jews), 51 percent hate [Jewish] settlers [of the Palestinian territories], and 50 percent Arabs" (Peretz, 2001, p.26).

Major parties to the conflict are also present in Syria and Lebanon. The Syrian government maintains the head quarters of both Hamas and The Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Damascus, and seeks the return of the Golan heights, occupied by Israel since 1967 (*Israel/Palestine Politics*, 2007; Mannes, 2004). Lebanon's southern territory has been occupied by the IDF and in the past and (possibly present) Palestinian resistance fighters/terrorists have sheltered there (Mannes, 2004). Indeed Palestinain Islamic Jihad and Hamas both have "extensive links" with Hizbullah (Mannes, 2004, p.164). Hizbullah also has important symbolic links to the perpetuation of violence in the conflict. Israel's complete withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 signified to many Palestinians the effectiveness of violence in liberating lands occupied by Israel (Hedges, 2001; Makovsky, 2001; Mannes, 2004;).

In a wider context, this conflict is clearly linked to tensions between Israel and her core ally the United States, and the Arab world. Abdelwahab Dermal, head of the Arab League, has argued that the demands of Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian Arabs are collective and cannot be viewed in isolation (Suri, 2007). Prime Minister Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi of Malaysia echoes this comment, arguing that the Israel-Palestinian conflict is the core issue behind tensions between the Muslim and Western worlds (*Israel-Palestine Issue*, 2007). A 2001 survey of Middle Eastern countries on the question of Palestine confirms this. Almost 60 percent of those polled in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, the gulf emirates, and Kuwait; and 79 percent of those in Egypt, felt that Palestine is the “single most important issue to them personally”(Roy, 2001, p.8). The Iraq Study Group’s December 2006 report also supports this link; advising that an equitable resolution of the Israeli-Palestine conflict would considerably improve the United States’ position in the Middle East (Brownfeld, 2007).

Indeed the United States has become a major party to the conflict. Al-Salhi (2007, *section and pages unmarked*) notes that the United States and Israel share an important “reciprocity in influence”. These include religious-ideological ties between American neo conservatives and messianic Jewish culture, and powerful political lobbying and aid flows between the two countries. For example United States economist Thomas Stauffer calculates that between 1973 and 2002 Israel received approximately US\$240 billion (calculated in 2001 US dollars) in economic and military aid (Francis, D. R., 2002). Before 2007, military aid to Israel stood at approximately US\$2.4 billion a year. In mid 2007 a new aid deal totalling US\$30 billion over ten years -a 25 percent increase- was negotiated between United States President George W. Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert (*Israel Hails*, 2007). Historically this aid has proved uniquely capable in shaping Israeli policy: Israel only withdrew from the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 when United States President Eisenhower threatened to cut off aid flows (Marshall, 1997). As such continued and especially increased United States economic and military aid suggests tacit support for Israel’s defence related policies: Israel’s present internationally illegal occupation and settlement in the Palestinian territories has not coincided with a sharp reduction in aid flows from the United States.

A large amount of pro Israeli lobbying is carried out in the United States by organisations such as StandWithUs and the Anti Defamation League. David (2007) notes three cases, over the span of three months, where pro Israeli lobbyists attempted to suppress standard, robust scholarly work because they argued it was “anti-Jewish” or Israeli-hating” p.1). Furthermore the United States occupies a position of world power which is advantageous to its ally Israel, who in turn is critical to American strategic interests in the Middle East.

The above increase in aid notwithstanding-D. R. Francis (2002) argues these are to counter Israeli fears of increased United States aid to Arab states such as Saudi Arabia- the outgoing United States administration has begun to iterate a more moderate line in the conflict. This coincides with a more forceful position with regard to its resolution. For the first time, on the 10th of January, 2008, during a trip to Israel and the West Bank, United States President Bush called for compensation for Palestinian refugees forced to flee during Israel’s establishment, and that Israel should end its occupation of lands following the Six Day War. President Bush went on to say “we need to look at the establishment of a Palestinian state and new international mechanisms, including compensation, to resolve the refugee issue” (Abramo-witz & Finer, 2008). He also stated that the United States wanted a settlement as much as Israelis and Palestinians did and that he would return for Israel’s 60th anniversary in May to add further pressure for progress towards a peace settlement (Abramo-witz & Finer, 2008).

In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States launched and then shelved a number of plans to resolve this conflict. These included the Rogers Initiative (1969-1970), the Saunders Document (1975), and the American-Soviet Declarations Regarding the Middle East (1977; all cited al Salhi, 2007).With the end of the first Intifada in 1988, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) accepted United Nations Security Resolution 242 of 1967, which called for the withdrawal of Israeli settlers from territories occupied after the Six Day War. In doing so it acknowledged the existence of Israel, and by also publicly renouncing violence drew Israeli and American diplomats to

negotiations (Mannes, 2004). In 1993 negotiations in Oslo, Norway culminated with recognition of the right to a Palestinian state and interim self government in Gaza and the West Bank. However in 1999, the five-year interim period expired without key issues of the conflict resolved and without key commitments being met by the parties. These included a reduction in Jewish settlement in the Palestinian territories and restricted security apparatus for the Palestinian Authority (PA) coupled with a cessation of violence towards Israel. The period of 1993-2001 actually saw the highest increase in settlements (peaking in 1999 and 2000) since illegal Israeli settlements began following the Six Day War (Reuveny, 2003, p.356). Indeed during the 1990s the number of Jewish settlements in the Palestinian territories nearly doubled (Hedges, 2001). Likewise the PA failed to curb Palestinian violence against Israelis and by 1998 had unilaterally increased the size of its security forces from 9,000 to 16,000 (Rubner, 1998). Norton (2001) notes that within Palestine “with one police officer for every 45 people, these forces far exceeded the levels agreed to by Israel in the [Oslo] accords (p.5). In 1999 the Sharm el-Sheikh summit was called to determine the permanent status of Gaza and the West Bank. With the subsequent failure of this and the Camp David summit, Israeli politician Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount set off the second Intifada in September 2000 (Roy, 2002).

The first intervention following the second Intifada was the Roadmap in 2003 presented by the Quartet (the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia). This was to finally settle the conflict by 2005 with Palestinian and Israeli sides taking reciprocal steps culminating in a two state solution. However the planned date for a permanent agreement has been deferred indefinitely due to both sides not fulfilling their commitments. For example Israel not halting the construction of illegal settlements in the West Bank and the continuation of Palestinian violence against Israelis (*CIA Factfile: West Bank*, 2007; Kellen, 2007).

With the death of Palestinian President Yasir Arafat in December 2004, Mahmud Abbas was elected as the new leader of the PA in January the follow year. Soon after, the PA and Israel agreed to meet some of the previous Sharm el-Sheikh commitments and Israeli settlers and military personnel left Gaza. A border crossing

between Egypt and Gaza was also to be reopened. Four West Bank settlements were dismantled. However during this time and since, other Israeli settlements in the West Bank have been expanded and new ones created (*CIA Factfile: West Bank*, 2007; Kellen, 2007).

The next major peace talks came in November 2007 in the United States at Annapolis between President Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Here they agreed to work for a wide-ranging peace agreement by the end of next year. United States President George Bush promised to actively "monitor and judge the fulfilment of the commitment of both sides". What was also encouraging was that both Saudi Arabia and Syria attended, neither of which formally acknowledges the state of Israel (*Israel/ Palestine Politics*, 2007).

Continued peace talks at Kuala Lumpur in December 2007 also received broadening international support. Malaysian Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Syed Hamid Albar noted that the United Nations Security Council, the Quartet and even the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC) have accepted a two state solution to the conflict with Israel existing side by side with a Palestinian state (*Israel-Palestinian Talks*, 2007).

The next round of talks were carried out in Israel between Tzipi Livni, Israel's foreign minister, and Ahmed Qurei, the former Palestinian prime minister. For the first time in seven years key issues were discussed such as Palestinian refugees and their descendants, Jerusalem, and the borders of Israel and a future Palestinian state. Both sides stated that they were unable to agree on these key issues but that efforts should be continued in securing peace. However, prior to the meeting Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared to come closer to Palestinian negotiators on the issue of illegal settlements: he called Israel's failure to dismantle them "a disgrace" (Kershner, 2008b). These talks also reveal a deep split in Israel over these key issues: as noted above the Shas party continues to threaten to leave government should these talks become serious whilst the Yisrael Beiteinu party has already left (Kershner, 2008a; Kershner, 2008b).

Meanwhile, throughout 2008 President Bush continued to push for a comprehensive peace settlement by the end of 2008 (*Bush Aims to Reignite*, 2008).

II. Some Peace and Conflict, and Development Theory

The theoretical perspective this essay takes is that conflict is socially constructed. As Lederach (1995) explains: “conflicts do not ‘just happen’...people are active participants...conflict emerges through an interactive process based on the search for and creation of shared meaning...rooted in peoples perceptions, interpretations, expressions, and intentions, each of which grows from and cycles back to their common sense knowledge” (p.9). From this perspective, if a conflict is sufficiently deep and left unresolved, it may become violent. While conflict is inevitable, the emergence, continuation or escalation of violence is not (Galtung & Jacobson, 2000).

Here violence is defined as “when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations”(Galtung, 1990, p.9). This may seem too broad to be operationalisable and rely on merely hypothetical concepts such as a human “potential”. However, such a broad definition is required to fully encompass various states which are not compatible with peace, and social and economic injustice. “Potential” refers to what is generally a physical possibility in a given situation, whereas “actual” refers to what is the reality of the situation. Therefore a drought, which was not preventable, may not be an example of violence. But a famine, if the result of an (avoidable) inequitable distribution of food, could be (Galtung, 1990). Thus any deliberate deprivation by one party of another party’s means of economic subsistence or unequal access to resources could be viewed as a form of violence.

From this perspective peace is defined as the “absence of violence” (Galtung, 1990, p.9). This simple definition is clarified by a number of categories of violence. With *physical violence* human beings are injured physically or killed by others (Galtung, 1990). *Psychological violence* encompasses “lies, brainwashing, indoctrination or

various kinds, threats, etc, that serve to decrease mental potentialities” (Galtung, 1990, p.10). *Cultural violence* describes “the source of other types of violence through its production of hatred, fear and suspicion” (Jeong, 1999, p.23). This violence can be direct or indirect (which in turn can be physical or psychological). Finally, *structural* (or *indirect*) *violence* is associated with the unfair distribution of: resources, decision making authority and life opportunities. For example institutional racism and the denial of free speech. Generally there is not a clear agent of this violence (Jeong, 1999). Structural violence is particularly relevant with regard to the question of how the distribution of non-renewable resources can maintain and build peace. Indeed unequal access to non renewable natural resources could be construed as a form of structural violence

Peace then has two dimensions; the absence of direct violence (*negative peace*) and the absence of indirect violence with the corresponding emergent social and economic justice (*positive peace*). Development theory is therefore intimately intertwined with conflict resolution strategies and processes (Galtung, 1990).

This approach sees conflict as having three components. These are attitudes (such as hatred, distrust, or perception of insanity or inhumanness), behaviour (which can be projections of psychological or physical violence), and contradictions (the incompatibility of goals). This is known as the ABC conflict triangle (Galtung, 2000a). These three aspects of conflict roughly correspond to cultural violence, direct violence, and structural violence, respectively. Causation of conflict generally flows from the contradiction, as the original conflict driver: an unresolved contradiction can lead to a build up of negative behavioural and attitudinal energies (Galtung, 1996). However the more visible direct and cultural violence (representing behaviours and attitudes) can actually obfuscate the root cause of a violent conflict: the contradiction (manifested in structural violence). As Galtung and Tschudi (2001) argue, an opening in the C corner of the ABC triangle can drain negative attitudes and behaviours and harmonise parties’ relations: “our argument is in favour of recovering the primacy of the root conflict , the contradiction itself” (p.211).

However it is critical that a peace building intervention does not attempt to deal *exclusively* with the contradiction or structural violence, and maintains a synergetic approach. As Galtung (n.d.) notes:

Conflicts can start in any corner and spread, for instance with negative attitudes, prejudice, toward foreigners ('strangers') projected into negative behavior, discrimination, whereupon an incompatibility may even be invented (like threats to the state).

To focus solely on the contradiction of a conflict, while neglecting the associated attitudes and behaviours is to risk, the *Marxist Fallacy*:

A focus on contradiction only based on social engineering, runs the risk of increasing hatred and violence...only trying to overcome the contradiction between labour and capital, regardless of the attitudinal and behavioural consequences, ultimately destroying the fruits of social engineering (Galtung, 2000a, *Module III*, p.3).

Indeed cultural attitudes provide the collective world view through which a community interprets its lived experience, draws conclusions about cause and effect relationships, assesses what economic conditions it is entitled to and how to pursue these entitlements (Appleby, 2003; Vendley & Little, 1994; Wiggins, 1996; Jeong, 1999). These attitudes can determine how a community responds to perceived structural or behavioural injustice. Therefore an approach to peace which ignores culture's role in violence threatens the sustainability of any "resolution" or transformation of the conflict. Attitudes may lead to re-ignition of violence as group circumstances continually evolve and are interpreted by parties beyond the scope envisaged by the architects of the initial peacebuilding strategy (Jeong, 1999). Indeed collective feelings of "relative deprivation" compound the potential for collective violence against an out-group (Gurr, 1970).

As Gopin (2000) notes, social or economic justice advocacy (as attempts to resolve structural contradictions without a focus on relationships) does not necessarily equal effective peacebuilding. Gopin (2000) points out that: "partisan approaches to conflicts may satisfy the call for justice but do little for true consensus building and

conflict resolution... there is no clear answer for the [practical] dilemma of justice seeking versus peace” (pp.161-162). In quoting the South African religious peacemaker, Khuzwayo Mbonambi, Gopin reminds us of the importance of positive relationships in sustainable peacebuilding: “Justice preserves the peace, but it never makes peace. Only reconciliation and forgiveness do that” (2000, p.162).

Furthermore Collier (2007) notes the role that violent conflict itself often plays as a *cause*, not just effect, of poverty and declines in absolute living standards. He notes that prolonged inter-communal violence is “development in reverse” (p.27). Violent conflict, is a “trap” which can lead to poverty and make this poverty difficult to escape from (Collier, 2007, p.17-37). As such sustained inter-communal violence can lead to and then be perpetuated or intensified by poor economic conditions and unequal access to renewable and non-renewable resources.

From this perspective violent inter-communal conflict can be seen as merely the visible manifestation of clearly deficient *relationships* between parties. The importance of these relationships is critical to the economic welfare, and therefore stability, of landlocked, resource-poor polities such as the West Bank (and Gaza when sea access is restricted; Collier, 2007, p.54; Sayigh, 2000-2001, p.13).

Resource-poor landlocked countries depend to a large degree on their neighbours for opportunities for economic growth (Collier, 2007, pp.54-58). Indeed landlocked resource-scarce countries increase their economic growth by 0.7 percent for every additional 1 percent their neighbours’ economies grow by. The average for all countries (landlocked or not) is only 0.4 percent (Collier, 2007, p.56). . Therefore landlocked countries can benefit especially from the growth of their neighbours by orientating their economies to those of their neighbours.

Two characteristic of the neighbours of landlocked, resource-poor states are particularly important. The first is the transport infrastructure of neighbouring countries. For the Palestinian territories this means principally Israel, who controls all of Palestine’s foreign borders (Hedges, 2001). Israel being a modern, industrialised state

can be expected to enjoy a correspondingly good transport infrastructure. This can facilitate the passage of Palestinian goods to further markets, especially since Israel itself is not landlocked.

The second factor of neighbouring countries concerns more general national characteristics. These include stability, prosperity, and neighbouring countries' trade policies with the landlocked resource-poor state. Israel is a relatively prosperous and stable country, suffering few of the famines, military coups, or civil wars which may plague other neighbours of resource-poor landlocked countries. The third important general national characteristic, trade policy, is more problematic. As noted above, the recent history of the Israel-Palestine has shown many breakdowns in economic and peaceful relations between Israel and the Palestinian territories. And disruptions in trade have often been directly associated with violence between the two states. For example even during the years 1993 to 1996 which exhibited the height of optimism surrounding Oslo, Roy, (2002) notes that "for almost one third of each year...Palestinians were prohibited from any physical or economic movement outside the West Bank and Gaza, and on the remaining days were subject to closure in a less extreme form (p.13).

As such, resumption of peaceful relations could then go on to protect and promote trade, which in turn would further promote peaceful relations. Indeed this last characteristic of *relationship* is the only ingredient missing from Collier's (2007) recipe for neighbour facilitated economic growth for landlocked, resource scarce states such as Gaza and the West Bank. Israel's relative stability, prosperity and strong transport infrastructure mean relations with it carry potent potential benefits for the Palestinian economy.

This analysis underlines the need for an integrative peace building and development strategy which seeks to deal with the long term *and* short term factors associated with violence and poor access to resources. This need is further demonstrated by the reality that with the failure of peace interventions, the contradictions of a conflict can worsen. Important sources of protracted, deep rooted

conflict (such as the Israel-Palestine conflict) are the “processes traditionally employed to deal with it” (Fisher, 1997, p.31).

III. An Interactive Problem Solving Strategy

Interactive Problem Solving (IPS) workshops offers a strategy to overcome such contradictions at the heart of the conflict while still addressing the attitudes and behaviours associated with them. This is based on an *interests based* approach where needs, concerns, fears and wants of each party (the deeper issues in the conflict) are collectively explored and the parties work on the conflict as a “problem” to find a solution which satisfies both parties (Sanson & Bretherton, 2001). Such a problem solving workshop for the Palestine-Israel conflict should include:

1. The breaking down of the conflict situations into parties and issues
2. Face-to-face interaction between representatives of two parties (at any one time) to a conflict
3. The use of a facilitator or panel of facilitators to assist dialog, and
4. Intense analytical interactions involving one or more seminars or “workshops” of a week or so duration (Burton and Dukes, 1990, p.143)

These face-to-face meetings should be conducted with mid level figures who are able to influence top level decision makers. One formulation is inviting highly respected people who have formal positions of leadership in key vocational areas. Lederach (1997) notes that these figures “are often the heads of, or closely connected to, extensive networks that cut across lines of the conflict” (p.51). They are also not restricted by the day to day survival demands which those at the grassroots level might experience (Lederach, 1997). Likewise, unlike upper level leaders, they are generally able to voice opinions and solutions which may be politically unpopular (Lederach, 1997). Mid-level interventions also seem to have the best potential for creating and maintaining an infrastructure for sustained violent conflict prevention, resolution, and the promotion of economic and social justice (Lederach, 1997).

Interactions between parties and facilitators should be conducted in an informal and 'off the record' atmosphere which allows the parties to interact in a way that is not possible in their usual societal/organisational environment or at public events (Lederach, 1997, pp. 45-46).

To bring this all about facilitators are responsible for bringing the parties together, facilitating the sessions and providing expert input on conflict analysis and resolution (Lederach, 1997). This should help the parties work through two processes. Firstly, the characterisation of negotiable interests and non-negotiable needs and values. From this the second process follows of helping the parties to identify options which are acceptable from the perspective of their interests, but which also meet their needs (Burton & Dukes, 1990, p.143).

This approach is markedly different to facilitated negotiation or positional bargaining which often produces a "loser" who harbours a desire to get back what they have "lost" (Burton & Dukes, 1990). The Human Security Brief 2006 reports that "wars that end in negotiated settlements last three times longer than those that end in victories and are nearly twice as likely to restart within five years" (Human Security Centre, 2007, p. 2).

In IPS issues of power and coercion are bypassed by the analytical approach which dominates interactions (Burton & Dukes, 1990). Nor is IPS similar to negotiated compromise where both parties get less than what they have already decided they want so that neither are satisfied (Sanson & Bretherton, 2001). Compromise strategies also ignore the existence of non-negotiable needs and values which are so often part of violent conflicts (Fisher, 1997).

Cognitive-behavioural psychology reveals further importance of this analytical approach in that inter-group interactions often lead to automatically activated prejudice which often determine the emotions and behaviours of individuals in intra-personal conflict (Olson & Fazio, 2006). However individuals are often only aware of this tension on emotional and behavioural levels. Interactive problem solving can then

reveal to them (and others), in a similar way to Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT), the underlying attitudes which are shaping their feelings and behaviour toward out-groups (Beck, Freeman, & Davis, 2006).

An analytical atmosphere is further facilitated by the satisfaction in IPS workshops of the five core conditions necessary for contact between groups to reduce prejudice. These are equal status among different groups; the pursuit of common goals; inter-group cooperation; support of authorities, law or custom; and finally, given the informal and non-official nature of workshops, the opportunity to become friends (see *The Contact Hypothesis*: Allport, 1954; Pettigrew, 1998).

Interactive Problem Solving is also not dependent on the assumptions of upper level, “trickle down” approaches to conflict resolution. These requirements include one exclusive hierarchal power within a party, and that this party will be able to *articulate* and *advocate* for the lower levels of the groups they represent. The danger of this assumption can be seen in the fractured nature of both Palestinian and Israeli intra party relations noted above. Indeed Kellen (2007) argues the most significant factor in the failure of international interventions in the Israeli-Palestine conflict from 2000 to 2006 was internal disputes within the Israeli and Palestinian parties. Hence a mid level intervention would seem to offer more immediate hope (Fisher, 1997). Indeed IPS played a significant role in the landmark 1993 Oslo Accords which saw the mutual recognition of Palestinian and Israeli states and PLO renounce violence: “the sharing of information and the formulation of new ideas provided important substantive inputs into the negotiations” (Kelman, 2001, p.106).

What’s more IPS has ensured that the political cost to challenging these decisions is too high for any political actor in the conflict to pay (Kelman, 2001). Only Hamas is an exception to this which remains cut off from the influential Palestinian President’s Fatah faction and the international community. Hamas influence is also limited to Gaza and it remains financially and constitutionally dependent on President Abbas.

One disadvantage to this intervention however, is that given the dependence on analysis, as noted above only two parties from a conflict should interact in a given workshop (Burton & Dukes, 1990). Intra-party disputes (which may cause micro-parties to develop) must be dealt with before the two macro-parties are brought together (Fetherston, (1991). As noted above the recent failure of peace interventions has been attributed to these internal disputes within the Israeli and Palestinian parties. Problem solving workshops should then be held between the various micro-parties in the Israel-Palestine conflict: Hamas meeting with Fatah, and Prime Minister Olmert's supporters meeting with supported of Yisrael Beiteinu and Shas. These intra-party workshops could follow the principals set out above, although their internal issues would be quite different. When agreement on key issues is reached, then inter-party IPS can begin.

This "two party" limitation in IPS is especially important in this conflict where powerful third parties provide such influential funding and organisational support to the parties in conflict. This support may then come to be seen by parties of the conflict to represent the potential for influential sanctions should the conflict's "status quo" not be maintained. Preparatory IPS workshops should therefore also be conducted at the third party level, between parties who traditionally in the conflict have come to view each other as "meta-parties" to the conflict. For example this could include Israeli/United States workshops as well as Syrian/Lebanese/Palestinian sessions. With their involvement in the process it is then hoped that these meta-parties could begin to envisage a way together that Israeli/Palestinian relationships could move forward without threatening the needs of influential third parties.

IV. Gaps in Peace Building: Some Initial Challenges of Implementation

The sustained success of conflict resolution strategies relies on vertical integration between *different levels* of groups in conflict (upper level, mid level, and grass roots) and horizontal integration between *different groups* (Lambourne, 2007a; Lederach, 1997). This has been likened to an electrical charge's "leap between the synaptic gap" between different levels of organisations and societies which enables the three types of

actors and approaches to function as one unified and mutually supporting synergetic system (Lynch, 2007a). Lederach (1997) makes these gaps explicit in his description and integration of the different levels of actors and strategies for peace building. This problem is called the *interdependence gap* and represents the need to integrate peace building approaches both vertically within groups and horizontally between groups (Lederach, 1999).

Another helpful concept in diagnosing the problems with a conflict resolution strategy is the *justice gap*. This refers to the need to reduce direct violence whilst also promoting social and economic justice. As Lederach (1999) notes: “much greater investment has been expended in the study and development of methodologies and practice for reducing *direct violence* than in transforming *structural violence*” (p.32, emphasis Lederach’s). Even from the perspective that *direct* violence is the primary or only negative manifestation of conflict, this physical violence is often only the most visible manifestation of deep, latent *structural* and *cultural* violence (Galtung, 1990; Tillett, 1990). Like an iceberg, larger conflict issues lurk below the surface, waiting to rise up again if the surface problems are reduced. Seeking to change only behaviour in a conflict leaves the core contradiction intact, resulting in the *conservative fallacy* of conflict resolution (Galtung & Tschudi, 2001).

Finally, the *process-structure gap* refers to the need for a conflict resolution strategy to be more than an endless dynamic process which leads to no definite outcome and can never be evaluated. Likewise, it must be more than a pre-decided structure imposed upon parties without their consultation and creative participation. Conflict resolution must be both. And when it is both, the focus turns instead to “embracing the permanency of relationship building” (Lederach, 1999, p.35).

Interactive Problem Solving with mid level participants relies on the relationships, status, and influence these individuals maintain with both the upper and grassroots levels in their home settings. A working knowledge of conditions at the other levels is required in order that solutions presented in the workshop will have a realistic chance of being applied outside the immediate workshop setting (Lederach,

1997). These integration challenges may adversely effect the implementation of an IPS intervention, which may not survive intact as it travels out to upper level leadership and the grass roots. Fisher (1997, pp.29-30) notes several cases in early IPS where successful workshops did not translate into positive implementation.

When viewed together, peace talks in the Palestine-Israel conflict have tended to suffer from a number of common problems outlined by Kellen (2007). These include the absence of political will, the absence of Israeli public support, the absence of the international community's determination and support, and a lack of implementation and enforcement mechanisms. All involve serious breakdowns of vertical and horizontal integration in the peace process. Clearly "reinforcement" of the link between mid level figures and both the grass roots and upper levels is needed.

V. "Middling Out" Reinforcement

From the perspective of Applied Behaviour Analysis (ABA) the Palestine-Israeli conflict, as embedded collective violence, is an example of a *nested, social trap* where highly motivating short-term rewards or punishments for a behaviour are stronger than the differing long-term consequences (Platt, 1973). The de-escalation of violence and other pro-social inter-group behaviours in conflict are also restricted by a *social fence* in that "the consideration of individual advantage prevents [people] from doing something which might otherwise be of great benefit to the group as a whole" (Platt, 1973, p.641). In a conflict parties can actually exacerbate each-others unproductive ways of looking at a conflict further blocking the emergence of new ideas (Galtung & Jacobsen, 2000). This is especially so where extremists are concerned; whose violent actions often support each-other in mutual conflict escalation and exert disproportional influence in driving the conflict (Galtung, 2000b)

Platt (1973) notes that "no cure of these nested lock-ins to violence...may be possible without the superordinate authority that can change all...self-maintaining loops simultaneously" (p.651). A standard method in ABA for achieving this is with the

introduction of short term positive reinforcement to support large scale behaviour change (Platt, 1973; Guest, 1962; Tharp & Wetzel, 1969). Positive reinforcement usually does not appear to threaten individual freedom and so avoids the “psychological reactance” associated with punishment strategies (Geller, 1989, p.23).

As noted above, equitable access to economic resources is critical for the evolution of negative peace into positive peace. An ABA intervention could promote positive peace by supporting the implementation of process-structures that emerge from the an IPS intervention related to the decrease of economic deprivation, more equal access to resources, and decreases in the associated direct violence. Change often represents a risk to relationships, influence, power, and individual autonomy. Positive reinforcement could offset some of these costs-providing motivational encouragement- whilst also providing financial, logistical and/or human resources to help with implementation. Secondly, prospective support for projects that workshop participants choose themselves could also encourage people to take part in the IPS. Finally, while process-structures which emerge from workshops may be valid, as noted above, implementation relies heavily on the personal potency of mid-level actors to effect change in their home settings. Supplementary positive reinforcement could provide the vertical and horizontal integration, economic and social justice orientation and process-structure focus for “gapless” peace building and regional stability.

From an economic perspective this positive reinforcement could facilitate increased access to economic resources for both parties, such as water, fuel, electricity or food. This is especially important for communities in regions such as the Middle East which often suffer only intermittent availability of critical resources. On water for example, Lonergan (2003, section heading: *Scarce resource*) notes that:

The Middle East and Africa provoke perhaps the greatest concern about water shortage: by 2025, 40 countries in the regions are expected to experience water stress or scarcity...In many water scarce countries, such as Jordan and Israel, there is no obvious and inexpensive way to increase water supply, and tensions among different water users are likely to result.

Indeed Wolf (2006) argues that “water management is, by definition, conflict management” (p.3).

Resource deprivation is also associated with more immediate facets of the Palestine-Israel conflict. For example, the UN estimates that during the Israeli economic blockade of the Second Intifada approximately US\$3.4 million was withheld from the Palestinian territories each day (Hedges, 2001, p.129). Since Hamas took control of Gaza following their victory in Palestinian elections, Gaza has often been cut off from vital supplies of humanitarian aid, fuel, electricity and other basic necessities, especially in retaliation to rocket attacks from the territory into Israel. As such the Gazan economy, health and social services have greatly suffered (Barzak, 2008; *Darkness Falls on Gaza*, 2008; *Israel Cuts Electricity*, 2008; *Israel Cuts Off Fuel*, 2008; *Trapped-Collective Punishment in Gaza*, 2008). Furthermore, frequent closures of the border between Israel and the Palestinian territories has meant the loss of critical export markets for Palestinian businesses, often culminating in local bankruptcies (Hedges, 2001; Roy, 2002). This economic deprivation feeds directly into the conflict. Roy (2003) observes that during the increased economic desperation in the Palestinian territories during the second Intifada popular backing for Hamas and other militant Islamic organisations increased: “by July 2001 the Islamist factions claimed 27 percent of polled support, which represented an 80 percent increase from 1996” (p.18). And Hedges (2001) writing during the second Intifada notes:

the economic squeeze [during the second Intifada] is taking its biggest toll on Arafat...[who] is working hard to make sure that this revolt does not replace him with [the more militant and less consolatory] Hamas... Hamas has nonetheless become venerated as the vanguard in the struggle against the Jewish state” (pp.133-134).

Positive reinforcement could ease these economic conditions in the short term and facilitate popular support for more moderate voices in the region.

Another example of the promotion of economic welfare and relationships in the Palestine-Israel region through positive reinforcement could be support for export diversification for parties to the conflict. Collier (2007) notes that “good access to

neighbouring markets is vital for landlocked countries without resources” (p.165). Collier (2007) suggests using the World Trade Organisation to facilitate different nations to “transfer” trade protection reductions to poor countries. Collier (2007) suggests this additional development role would mirror the World Bank’s expansion, with the inclusion of the International Development Association, into providing transfers to poor countries (pp.171-2). This increase in trade opportunities for the Israel-Palestine region would become even more significant should economic relations between the two parties improve. This is particularly so with Palestine’s reliance on Israeli transport infrastructure and markets, and Palestine itself representing a cheap source of labour, goods, and services for Israeli businesses and consumers. Both Sayigh (2000-2001) and Makovsky (2001) agree that due to structural inter-dependencies, greater economic cooperation would provide important benefits to both parties’ economies and greater regional stability.

The provision of positive reinforcement (whether aid, reduced trade barriers, or other benefits) should be tied to whether adequate effort and progress have been made on the pre-agreed goals emerging from the IPS process. This should be monitored by an unbiased body such as organisations under the umbrella of the United Nations or the European Union which are not partial to one party in the conflict. The Quartet (the United States, the United Nations, the European Union, and Russia) which presented the 2003 Roadmap may also be a viable monitoring body. The United States alone, with strong aid and military ties to Israel would not seem to be the ideal monitoring body for this process despite the active role it has played previously. Collier (2007) notes the general impotence of aid as an incentive for improved social and economic policy when it is tied to *promises* of improvements in policy, rather than the actual *level* of policy change. The link between on the actual level of policy progress and the aid incentive is referred to as *governance conditionality* (p.109).

Collier (2007) also points out that externally mandated governance goals (such as those prescribed by the International Monetary Fund) interfere with a government’s accountability and citizens own and faith and sense of empowerment in their political process: “If governments were being ordered about by donor agencies, whom should an

electorate blame if things went wrong?” (p.109). Through the IPS process citizens themselves are able to derive the conditions which will signify improvements in the social, political and economic relationships of the parties. As Collier (2007) notes: “the key objective of *governance* conditionality is not to shift power from governments to donors, but to shift power from governments to their own citizens” (p.110; emphasis Collier’s).

As noted in Section I, the failure of Oslo was to a large degree due to each party’s failure to meet their own key interim commitments. On the issue of Jewish settlements, a number of commentators argue that the Palestine-Israel conflict cannot be successfully resolved without an Israeli withdrawal from these settlements in the West Bank and Gaza or territorial compensation for land which is not returned (Hedges, 2001; Hertzberg, 2001; Makovsky, 2001; Reuveny, 2003; Roy, 2002; Telhami, 2001). Positive reinforcement with governance conditionality could make this financially feasible with funding for movement costs, security, land and building compensation. Political feasibility is also critical. One should not read too much into the recent withdrawal of Yisrael Beiteinu from the ruling coalition and threats from the Shas Party to do likewise. Reuveny (2003) and Hertzberg’s (2001) show that while there is important political resistance to settlement withdrawal within Israel, demonstration that their removal *supports* Israeli security rather than *endangers* it would erode this resistance which would be confined to a radical religious minority. At present many Israelis are already in favour of some or total withdrawal. Polls conducted between 2000 and 2005 show that between half and three quarters of Israelis are in favour of at least partial withdrawal from the Palestinian territories with this peaking in March 2002 at 74 percent (Reuveny, 2003, p.373).

Positive reinforcement could also directly aid the Palestinian government’s official efforts in controlling militant political factions (such as Hamas) whose violence disrupted the Oslo peace process and could threaten future peace interventions. Roy (2003) notes that during the second Intifada moderates within the PA were unable to control Hamas or other militants whose violence undermined the PA and its efforts at diplomacy. Positive reinforcement could then also be tailored to support official

initiatives from the Palestinian side, whose efforts might usually be muted by “peace spoilers” within the Palestinian territories.

Positive reinforcement however could also have something to offer Hamas and other militant Islamic organisations. Langohr (2001) notes the strong tradition that many Islamic political movements have in the provision of social services to their local communities. For the Palestinian context, Langohr (2001) notes that “its image as a violence-prone group notwithstanding, Hamas is first and foremost a social movement that prioritises the provision of social services to its constituency” (p.594). This twin pronged approach has thus “placed [Hamas] in the delicate position of trying to continue its violence against Israeli targets without provoking the Palestinian Authority to retaliate by crushing its service institutions” (Langohr, 2001, p.594). In the two or three years before the failure of Camp David, Hamas ceased to consistently call for violent action against Israel but instead focused on the provision of social services which represents, Roy (2003) argues, “an emerging new logic between state and society” (p.13). This demonstrates the critical role that social services can play in militant Islamic organisations’, such as Hamas, evaluation the effectiveness of violence in achieving their objectives. This focus on social services could thus increase the effectiveness of positive reinforcement by further promoting the provision of these services and keeping this increased capacity conditional on abstinence from violence. In the mean time, a cessation of Israeli military and economic action against Palestinian society and attacks on civil institutions would enable these social services to recover (Roy, 2003). Thus improved economic conditions could change the focus of Hamas and other militant Islamic organisations’ operations and, as noted above, draw less support to its more radical positions and more to moderate elements within the Palestinian political landscape.

Appropriate sponsors for this positive reinforcement could include development or peace funds with mission statements compatible with sustained peacebuilding through the transformation of inter-group relationships and the relief of economic deprivation.

Ideally prospective sponsors of need would meet requirements a number of other requirements. These include allowing for a balance between accountability with

flexibility. Both secure long term funding and short term contingency funds need to be available to manage difficulties on the ground and meet the unforeseeable costs associated with working in volatile conflict zones (Francis, D., 2002). Furthermore the sponsor should be an organisation which has demonstrated and can guarantee long term commitment to the region and support for any positive political developments which may evolve out of the overall process (Fisher, 1997).

Of course detailed cost/benefit analyses would have to be carried out to attract sponsors. Sponsors should also be evaluated against the specific intervention plan and how well they conform to the above criteria. Prospective funds might include the United Nations Peace Building Fund, United Nations Development Programme Joint Programme, United Nations Development Programme Multidonor Trust Funds, the United Nations Democracy Fund, the European Union Peace Fund, or Elysee Frontier “Funds for Peace”. Private Companies whose brand philosophy is compatible with international cooperation, such as those who sponsor the Olympic Games, may also be appropriate if their influence is restricted to the provision of funds and publicity of their efforts. As well as damaging actual economies conflict destroys disposable income for consumer goods and services. This could also promote the commercial ties to further facilitate economic growth and regional stability.

Nevertheless procedural challenges remain. This intervention assumes that the reinforcement would not be distributed or utilised in a way which increases intra-party division, exacerbates existing conflict drivers or creates new ones. Therefore a clear budget would have to be set out before-hand of just what the reinforcement will be used for and how. This flows into the next challenge of taking care that one group is not perceived to receive more than another. As noted in Section II this “relative deprivation” can compound the potential for collective violence. This again should be planned for before the positive reinforcement is applied, and an effective IPS workshop should enable both groups to get some idea of the costs involved in implementing different proposals.

Empirical challenges also remain. Relatively little research has been carried out on the role of positive reinforcement in reducing inter-group conflict. However success has been reported with children staying in school and exhibiting less criminal behaviour (representing reduced conflict with educational and social norms and associated less criminal behaviour; Coutu, 1981; Gorman, 1994) or decreases in crime rates for neighbourhoods (Mann, 1973; Mann, 1976). A second issue is that while ABA has been successful at the small group and individual level, when applied to large groups the results have generally been marginal (Geller, 1987; Geller, 1989). Aid is however well known in its ability to shape the behaviour of political actors. As noted in Section I, the threat of removal of United States' military aid prompted Israel's pullout from the Sinai Peninsula. Additionally, following the first Intifada, Israeli Prime Minister Shamir was voted out because he refused to pledge that Israel would suspend illegal settlement construction when United States President George Bush Senior threatened to withhold US\$10 billion in loan guarantees. A third issue is a straight-forward condition of behavioural psychology that any reinforcement is viewed by the as a clear consequence of an individual's own behaviour. As inter-group conflict is affected by a *social fence* described above, reinforcement distributed at a group level may not seem relevant to an individual's own behaviour. Although the affiliation one normally feels for a group in conflict could mitigate this; to what degree is unclear. Overall, while offering promise, an ABA intervention still exhibits a number of empirical challenges, which necessitates a third arm of strategy.

VI. "Middling Out" Media

Interactive problem solving works primarily on resolving contradictions through creative solutions that alter the *structure* of inter-group relationships. Positive reinforcement deals primarily with behaviours. However attitudes remain an integral part of the "ABCs" of conflict. As noted in Section II a primary focus on either behaviour or contradiction gives rise to the Conservative Fallacy or Marxist Fallacy. Negative attitudes may make conflict issues appear invisible or intractable. Attitudes can also be the vehicle for praise-based positive reinforcement of violent behaviour.

These problems can also be seen as a lack of horizontal and vertical integration in the peace building process which compounds justice and process-structure gaps.

Many social-cognitive principals contribute to peace resistant attitudes. Examples from social psychology include: perceived out-group homogeneity (Boldry Gaertner & Quinn, 2007) favourable group comparison to increase collective self esteem (Hunter, 2003), and the solidification of social norms within groups who perceive themselves to be under threat (Long, 2005).

Cognitive psychology reveals attitude consistent information seeking (Olson & Fazio, 2006) and attributing positive events to an internal locus and negative events to an external locus of control (Heckel, 1977). Mirroring this is the tendency to attribute the positive actions of a conflicting out-group with a locus of control external to that group, while seeing violence as a result of a locus of control internal to that group (Heckel, 1977). An internal locus of control has also been termed “disposition”, and external locus “circumstances” or contextual explanations (Opatow, 2000, p.408; Lynch, 2007b and also see Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, for more information on the importance of disposition). There is also the tendency to assume that the most available examples of group behaviour are representative of that group’s normal behaviour (Rothman & Hardin, 1997) and the existence of automatically activated prejudice (Olson & Fazio, 2006). Problem solving outlines negative out-group perception; unrecognised entrapment and unrecognised options (Mitchell, 2003).

The outcomes of IPS workshops are strictly speaking only agreements between the immediate participants. Broader support still has to be built horizontally and vertically. Media can do this by changing cultural norms, improving communication and understanding, and showing the potential benefits of IPS outcomes (Lynch, 2007a; *Media Intervention*, 2005). Furthermore media can address cognitive barriers to peace such as those outlined above and can be most effective when it adopts the “vocabulary, images and symbols” of conflict resolution (*Media Intervention*, 2005, p.). In this way Media has been successful in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine (*Media Intervention*, 2005).

Geller (1989) outlines five principals from a behavioural perspective which promote the effectiveness of media for the present purpose:

(a) the target behavior is relatively easy to emit... (b) the desirable or undesirable behavior is specified in precise terms, (c) convenient alternative desirable behaviours are indicated when avoidance of an undesired behavior is targeted, (d) the message is delivered in close proximity to opportunities for emitting the target behavior... and (e) the message is stated in polite language that does not threaten an individual's 'perceived freedom' (p. 21).

From a social perspective Vrij, Akehurst and Smith (2003) outline seven principals for public campaigns to reduce prejudice: an emphasis on inter-group similarities; a focus of *positive* similarities; the display of many representative members of each group; clear, explicit messages; a credible source; the statement the illegality of a prejudice behaviour; and the use of both "central" logical arguments and "peripheral" superficial cues.

Peace Journalism (PJ) also suggests another important element which media campaigns should include: "picking up on suggestions for non-violent responses from whatever quarter, and remitting them into the public sphere" (Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005, p.18). Reports of Israeli's and Palestinians own lived experience should be part of this intervention. Furthermore conventional journalism often highlights to radicals on either side, giving them a disproportionate influence in the framing of conflict. With a fuller view of the conflict, Palestinians and Israelis would be more able to see the underlying contradictions, and how these drive conflictual attitudes and behaviour. For the Israel-Palestine conflict this would include a larger emphasis on the history of the conflict, stretching back to resurgent Arab and Jewish nationalism of the nineteenth century. What's more PJ could show the less visible effects of the violence, such as cycles of trauma, and the damage to the culture and structure of the involved groups often neglected in conventional journalism (Peleg, 2006). With this approach, relationships in the conflict could benefit through the various levels of the conflict: from the narrower conflict *issues*, local *subsystems*, and the overall *system* of the conflict (Lederach, 1997).

VII. Accessing Latent Conflict Resolution Process-Structures: An Evolving Infrastructure for Peace Building.

The reinforcement strategy outlined above is an *active intervention*, requiring the knowledge and energy of a third party. Interventions which involve indefinitely continuous third party rewards to the parties in the conflict are generally not appropriate in modifying the behaviour of large numbers of people in the long term (Hayes, 1977). Such a situation would hardly build the trust and positive attitudes, tendencies for non-violence, social justice, and equal economic relationships that characterise sustainable positive peace. The aim must then be to enable the process-structure to continue after the reinforcement has been removed. In other words the conversion to a *passive intervention* appropriate “in which the means of control are built into the situation itself” with less need for the input of a third party (Hayes, 1977, p.8). This will in turn contribute to more internal ownership of group peace processes and equal relationships.

This can be achieved by establishing positive social contingencies (Hayes, 1977). This is the encouragement from ones own group to express socially appropriate behaviours. These contingencies can then have a “social multiplier” effect encouraging positive behaviour which exceeds the simple of individual level behaviours in a group (Glaeser, Sacerdote & Scheinkman, 2002). For example the political cost will increase internally for supporters of direct and economic violence (the cutting off of fuel, electricity, food etc from Israel to Gaza for example) as constituencies associated with this violence come to see the predictable outcomes of these actions: the immediate cessation of positive reinforcement.

Associated with this would be a gradual development of trust and breakdown of negative out-group psychology as each begins to view the other as “predictable” “rational”, and therefore less threatening and more “human”. The media interventions and peace journalism programmes noted in Section VI will clarify these understandings. Indeed between groups, there is no problem of scarcity in social needs satisfaction;

instead there is the presence of another social multiplier. “The more identity or security that one party has, the more not the less the other party will experience identity and security. Scarcity is an issue only when searching for means” (Burton & Dukes, 1990, pp.143-144). Another social and economic need, cooperation, also follows this pattern: “competition leads to more competition; cooperation leads to more cooperation” (Sanson & Bretherton, 2001, p.198).

Galtung’s TRANSCEND method of conflict transformation shows how it is important to “disembed” the conflict from discourse where issues appear insurmountable and inherent in group characteristics and needs (Galtung, 2000a, section heading: *Creativity, Transcendence and Transformation*, p.4):

If the parties can agree that the structure was/is deficient and that their behaviour was an enactment of structural positions rather than anything more personal, then turning together against the common problem, the structural violence, should be possible (Galtung, n.d, p.66).

Initially stimulated by media and positive reinforcement, Palestinian and Israeli parties could then amplify and perpetuate this process themselves.

Finally, the combination of positive reinforcement and media intervention should help group members to start seeing the conflict from this structure-orientated perspective where they can see their own group’s role in perpetuating the conflict and provoking the out-group’s violence. Where parties begin to see the impact that unequal distribution of resources has on relationships, and how they can support each other to promote social justice and more equal access to resources. When this process has begun, the provision of positive reinforcement can be slowly tapered off along a predetermined schedule. This can occur as the perceived risks and costs of changes in attitudes, behaviour and motivations disappear; scarce resources become more available; perceptions of relative deprivation decrease; and economies recover. The unprompted, non-violence which groups should begin to exhibit will demonstrate to parties the critical importance of circumstances versus disposition on collective violence. This will aid reconciliation and forgiveness, helping groups to disembed the conflict as noted

above (Lynch, 2008a; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2005). As such more equal access to scarce resources, peace, and regional stability will come to be seen as the rewards of non-violent works and restraint from violence. This is critical because, particularly in the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Israel and western forces' withdrawal from Lebanon has come to signify for increasingly desperate Palestinians that violence should be the principal tool to achieve a secure homeland (Hedges, 2001; Makovsky, 2001; Mannes, 2004). The gradual tapering off of positive reinforcement and increasingly positive relationships may be vulnerable to peace spoilers in either party, who wish the external funding to continue indefinitely or who do not benefit from it at all. However, it is hoped that the checks and balances of the various approaches that make up this intervention, along with increasingly positive process-structures, would minimise this.

Conclusion

Peace building and aims to promote global stability must go beyond formal peace agreements and directives "to changing the motivations, goals, beliefs, attitudes and emotions of the great majority of the society members regarding the conflict, the nature of the relationship between the parties, and the parties themselves" (Bar-Tal & Bennink, p. 12 as cited in Media Intervention, 2005, p.24). This is just one attempt to do so, drawing on various techniques which seem to offer more promise than any single intervention applied in isolation. By this it is hoped that the challenges of formulation, implementation, and internalisation of a more just distribution of scarce resources and sustainable peace might be supported; with ultimate control of the process coming to rest with the parties themselves.

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